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Sustained productivity growth in the agricultural sector is a key component of a 
country’s path out of poverty. The quantitative development of Rwanda’s agriculture 
in recent years has been widely regarded as a success story and as further evidence 
for the effectiveness of its government to bring about sustained socio-economic 
progress. However, simple statistical analysis of publicly available data shows that 
food crop production volumes and yields have actually stagnated over the last fifteen 
years. Moreover, agricultural output was significantly overestimated from 2008-2013 
and then silently corrected downwards in Rwandan and international datasets. As a 
result, the country’s economic growth numbers are very likely inflated as well. After 
presenting substantive evidence for these claims, this paper discusses three issues 
arising from them. First, it argues that yield-raising effects of massive mineral 
fertiliser application and other ‘Green Revolution’ technologies were offset by the 
enormous disruption resulting from the government’s rigorously enforced agricultural 
reform programme. Second, it finds that massive food crop production 
overestimation likely proliferated due to a flawed performance-based governance 
system that incentivised bureaucrats and farmers to tweak the numbers instead of 
compelling them to achieve actual results. Even more, this inflation prevented early 
detection of agricultural stagnation and consequently also the required adaptation of 
agricultural policy. Third, the exceptional ‘brand-building’ capabilities of the Rwandan 
ruling elite led to the preservation of its false reputation of having achieved 
skyrocketing yield growth. As a silver lining, a few recently revised reform 
components point to the possibility of an eventually more successful agricultural 
transformation, whose chances might hinge on the government’s ability to allow 
more discretion of bureaucrats and more inclusion of local knowledge. 
Keywords: Rwanda; agricultural transformation; agricultural statistics; performance 
contracts; state effectiveness. 
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Agricultural transformation is widely seen as a necessary but not sufficient part of 
economic development (Johnston and Mellor 1961; World Bank 2008). Historically, 
fundamental agricultural transformations have been early and central elements in the 
development of both early industrialisers in the global North and 20th century 
success stories in East Asia. For example, England becoming the first industrialised 
nation in the world was pre-dated by a productivity explosion in its agriculture 
(Apostolides et al. 2008) and a revolution of its land ownership structure (Wood 
2002). Similarly, Taiwan’s spectacular post-War industrialisation was made possible 
by profound land reforms under Japanese colonialization (Kohli 2004) and a policy 
and institutional structure that compelled agricultural productivity growth (Amsden 
1979). However, such social transformations are complex (Khan 2012) and simplistic 
policies trying to impose rapid change from above can lead to costly failures, for 
instance during the Great Leap Forward in China (Li and Yang 2005) and the 1970s 
villagization programme in Tanzania (Scott 1998). 
In economic terms, agricultural transformation can be defined as sustained 
agricultural productivity growth over two-three decades accompanied by rural income 
increases for a majority of the population (Whitfield et al. 2015:42). Conceptually, it 
may be structured in two distinct yet closely interrelated aspects: the technological 
‘Green Revolution’ part (application of mineral fertiliser and improved seeds, 
mechanisation, irrigation, etc.) and the political economy (government efforts to 
initiate and implement transformative policies including land reform). In practice, the 
two components go hand in hand and governments have to master both to achieve 
sustained agricultural development (Hazell 2009; Tsakok 2011). 
Regarding technological factors, a recent major study with a sample of over 70 
developing and emerging countries from 1961-2000 found that fertiliser application is 
the single most important determinant to explain the rise of cereal yields (McArthur 
and McCord 2017). The two other significant factors, which were much smaller in 
size, were precipitation levels and improved seeds, while all other variables were 
found to be insignificant. However, other components of agricultural modernisation, 
such as the expansion of irrigation and mechanisation, country-specific agricultural 
research, the provision of rural infrastructure (e.g. feeder roads and storage 
facilities), and quality extension services are widely seen as further enabling factors 
to substantially raise yields (Alaerts 2020; Chang 2009; Diao, Cossar, et al. 2014; 
Fuglie and Rada 2016). Moreover, the organisation of farming and land ownership 
(e.g. smallholders as proprietors or as tenants, contract farming, large-scale 
capitalists), and broader political economy and governance aspects often have 
strong impacts and demonstrate the complexity of sustained agricultural 
development (Deininger, Hilhorst, and Songwe 2014; Holden and Otsuka 2014; 
Jayne, Chamberlin, and Headey 2014). Finally, the preferences and livelihoods of 
smallholder farmers, who are usually the central subjects addressed by various 




manifests itself in fundamental insecurity (Wood 2003). As a result, peasants, rather 
than striving to maximize yields and income, are particularly risk-averse and focus on 
food security (Ansoms 2010; Rapsomanikis 2015). To achieve these goals, crop 
diversification, intercropping and preferring low-yield drought-resistant crops in 
favour of those maximizing yields and income have proliferated over decades and 
centuries (Cervantes-Godoy, Kimura, and Antón 2013; Van Damme, Ansoms, and 
Baret 2014). The forced abrupt change of such a system might lead to severe 
production disruption with potentially catastrophic effects on food security and even 
political stability. 
During the Asian Green Revolution 1965-1990, food crop production volumes and 
yields multiplied, nutrition improved significantly and poverty fell sharply across 
several Asian countries and regions (Hazell 2009). Beyond this general notion, there 
remains much discussion and controversy about the effects of Asia’s agricultural 
intensification on inequality (Freebairn 1995), the trade-off between poverty 
reduction and negative ecological impacts (Biswas 1994; Faeth 1993), as well as 
injustice during transition processes (Robbins 2012). In contrast, there has been 
limited transformation in sub-Sahara African agriculture, which is still characterised 
by “a vast and only slowly changing number of poor smallholders contributing most 
of agricultural output, […] low yields, limited commercialization, few signs of rapid 
productivity growth, and population–land ratios that are not declining” (Collier and 
Dercon 2014:92). However, the trajectories of African countries are obviously 
heterogeneous (Badiane, Diao, and Jayne 2021). While international organisations 
have advocated for an African Green Revolution (AfDB 2016; Toenniessen, Adesina, 
and DeVries 2008; World Bank 2008), critics argue that these aspirations are 
neoliberal commodification projects (Moseley, Schnurr, and Bezner Kerr 2015) and 
might well lead to ecological collapse (IPES-Food 2016). 
To evaluate whether a particular country’s agricultural policies are effective, an 
obvious analytical starting point is its agricultural statistics. Unfortunately, crop 
production and yield data in developing countries is often of poor quality (Jerven 
2014). Incompatible estimates from different data sources for the same crop and 
year as well as unrealistic one-year jumps within a time series are common (Carletto, 
Jolliffe, and Banerjee 2015). Also, non-standardised methods and units provide large 
space for ‘negotiation’ of data that can lead to highly distorted numbers. Regularly, a 
range of competing, mutually exclusive data sources exist, allowing governments 
and international organisations to ‘choose’ the most convenient one (Jerven 2014). 
All this warrants a careful and detailed analysis of different available datasets on 
agricultural development before drawing conclusions on the success or failure of 
agricultural reforms.  
At its core, this paper conducts such a data analysis for the agricultural sector of 
Rwanda from 2005-2019, thereby examining the macro-effects of the country’s 
agriculture transformation strategies. To that end, publicly available data from 




used. Simple descriptive statistics methods suffice to reveal compelling data 
patterns. The data section’s merit comes from very cumbersome data compilation 
and careful cross-examination of a plethora of distinct and partially inconsistent 
Rwandan and international sources. Besides the obvious scrutinising of all available 
documents (academic literature, government strategies and reports, analyses of 
international organisations, and articles of the national and international media), 
additional evidence was obtained from interviewing two former Rwandan 
government employees as well as from email correspondence with the FAO 
statistics department (FAOSTAT) and the Rwandan national statistics institute 
(NISR). The Rwandan ministry for agriculture (MINAGRI) did not reply to two written 
inquiries.1 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces Rwanda’s 
agrarian sector and illustrates various facets of the country’s recent agricultural 
transformation as well as the evolution of its agricultural statistics system. Section 3 
presents Rwandan agricultural production and yield data from 2005-2019 by 
dissecting both Rwandan and FAO datasets. It shows that overall food crop output 
stagnated and that there has been significant overestimation of production levels and 
yields. As a result, Rwanda’s (agricultural) gross domestic product (GDP) is also 
inflated. Section 4 discusses potential explanations for the peculiar data patterns. 
First, the interdependent effects of the technological and political economy aspects 
of Rwanda’s agricultural transformation strategy on the country’s food production 
output are assessed. Then, the mechanics and politics of data collection are 
scrutinised to shed light on six years of massive and escalating food crop production 
overestimation. Finally, aspects of the government’s efforts to create and maintain a 
solid reputation of high agricultural transformation performance are illustrated. 
Section 5 concludes by considering promising aspects of the country’s recent 
agrarian journey and suggesting that a reform of Rwanda’s performance contract 
system might lead to a more effective and successful agricultural transformation. 
2. Rwanda’s Agricultural Transformation 
In academic scholarship and international development, Rwanda stands out as a 
country that emerged from the apocalyptic tragedy of the 1994 genocide against the 
Tutsi to become a paragon of state effectiveness and socio-economic development 
(Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2012; Chemouni 2018), while simultaneously 
 
1 The two interviewed persons were a former senior manager at MINAGRI responsible for food crop 
production and a former MINAGRI intern in charge of data compilation from agricultural surveys. Their 
testimonies as well as the statements from FAOSTAT and NISR are used as evidence in section 4. 
Three other contacted (former) Rwandan government officials did not reply to written requests. It 
needs to be admitted here that beyond these sparse occasions, evidence collection and data analysis 
was mostly conducted without discussing issues with Rwandan organisations or individuals. The 
author has lived in Rwanda for three years, of which he spent ten months (January-August and 
October-November 2019) on intensive PhD-related fieldwork, interviewing over one hundred 
Rwandans working in government, business, and agriculture. However, the particular topic of this 
paper was not studied during fieldwork, as the author only stumbled upon the peculiar data patterns 




maintaining a dismal record on political and human rights (Reyntjens 2013; Straus 
and Waldorf (eds.) 2011). 
Rwanda’s exceptional record of almost 8% annual economic growth over the last two 
decades (and over 5% per capita growth) made it rank in Africa’s top three in this 
time period. However, agriculture still accounts for 24% of the country’s national 
income, with close to 70% of the working age population engaged in it (World Bank 
Group and Government of Rwanda 2019:221). Almost two thirds of agricultural value 
comes from food crops. Average annual agricultural growth was reported as 5.4% 
over the last two decades, of which nearly two thirds were attributed to food crop 
growth. Virtually all Rwandan farmers are smallholders and engage fully or partially 
in subsistence agriculture. 
There is a consensus in academics that Rwanda has succeeded in substantially 
raising its total agricultural production volume and that this was largely driven by 
substantive yield growth. An often-used summary is that between 2007 and 2011 
production volumes of cassava, maize and wheat tripled, those of beans doubled, 
and rice and Irish potato output rose by 30%. This statement appears in lauding 
(Golooba-Mutebi 2014), agnostic (Harrison 2016) and condemning (Cioffo, Ansoms, 
and Murison 2016) articles on Rwanda’s agricultural policies. Reports of international 
organisations use very similar formulations (Diao, Bahiigwa, and Pradesha 2014 
(IFPRI); IFAD 2013; World Bank 2014). Virtually all other academic works concerned 
with post-genocide Rwandan agriculture at least implicitly acknowledge the general 
notion of the country’s agrarian macro-level success. Donors increased their 
contributions based on these numbers (Harrison 2016) and Agnes Kalibata, 
Rwanda’s agriculture minister from 2008-2014, has been lauded as the responsible 
mastermind and received several international prizes for her achievements (AFP 
2019; NAS 2019). 
Agricultural activity is coordinated by the Ministry for Agriculture and Animal 
Husbandry (MINAGRI) and its two main agencies, the Rwanda Agriculture Board 
(RAB) and the National Agriculture and Export Board (NAEB). Additionally, the 
National Institute for Statistics of Rwanda (NISR) commissions agricultural surveys 
and collects agricultural data. The most important administrative units of local 
government are Rwanda’s 30 districts, which prioritise and organise agricultural 
activity via their district agronomists and cash crop officers, as well as government-
appointed personnel in each of the country’s 416 sectors (Chemouni 2014). 
Cooperatives have been established as rural change agents to eventually grow into 
capitalistic actors (Harrison 2017). However, they are not grassroots- but 
government-driven, and so far, both the membership rate and the level of 
professionalism have been very low (Ansoms et al. 2018). While large-scale agrarian 
projects have been initiated (Gaynor 2015; RDB 2019), agricultural surveys show 
that major capitalist farms so far only account for a small share of output and 




Rwanda’s agricultural year lasts from September to August. It has two major 
agricultural seasons: season A, for which planting starts in mid-September 
(coinciding with the start of the short rain season) and harvesting takes place from 
mid-December to mid-February, and season B, where sowing commences in March 
(parallel to the long rain season) and the harvest occurs from early June to mid-July 
(WFP 2016). In recent years, total production has been slightly higher in season A. 
Additionally, there is a tiny third season (season C) with harvesting in September 
that accounts for less than 2% of total production and is therefore often neglected. 
Both the calendar year and the Rwandan fiscal year (July-June) contain the same 
season A and B, which makes comparing different data sources easier.   
2.1 Government Strategy and Implementation 
Rwanda’s yield growth is ascribed to its ambitious agrarian reform programme, 
formulated in its agricultural transformation strategies, currently in its fourth 
recurrence (MINAGRI 2018b), and guided by the country’s overall Vision 2020. The 
policies follow a technocratic ‘Green Revolution’ rationale of agricultural 
intensification, modernisation and commercialisation. Already in 2004, a land tenure 
regularization process had been initiated that led to both much higher land rights 
formalisation and a –potentially temporary– increase in land conflicts (Ali, Deininger, 
and Duponchel 2017; Santos, Fletschner, and Daconto 2014). Over the past years, 
the main policy regarding agricultural growth has been the Crop Intensification 
Programme (CIP) that ran from 2007–2020. At its heart was the creation of regional 
monocropping zones based on agro-climatic conditions (Harrison 2016). For this 
endeavour, six priority crops were selected: beans, cassava, Irish potatoes, maize, 
rice, and wheat. The overall goal was to achieve food security and eventually a food 
surplus for export by increasing food crop production volumes (Kathiresan 2011). 
This was to be reached largely by substantive yield growth (intensification) via 
various Green Revolution techniques (see below) but also by increasing cultivated 
land area (extensification) via the reclaiming of marshland, which was quite 
successful (Dawson, Martin, and Sikor 2016).2 
The CIP comprised four pillars: land use consolidation (LUC), provision of inputs, 
extension services, and improved post-harvest storage. Regarding LUC, farmers 
were encouraged or compelled to synchronize crop cultivation by switching to the 
centrally determined priority crop of their region on rearranged adjacent plots to 
counter the extremely small size of land holdings (0.76 hectares on average, spread 
over several scattered plots) (Kathiresan 2011). An elaborate input provision system 
was designed, implemented and adapted over time, in which farmers participating in 
the CIP and complying with LUC received substantially subsidised mineral fertilisers 
(Chemouni 2016). Additionally, improved seeds and pesticides were distributed 
regularly (RAB 2013, 2017). Extension services entailed education and consulting, 
such as the propagation of good agronomic practices like terracing against erosion 
 
2 An additional aspect of Rwanda’s agricultural policies revolves around livestock, which is not 




and manure application (MINAGRI 2009b, 2018b) as well as the establishment of 
plant clinics (Tambo et al. 2020), but also detailed monitoring and strict enforcement 
of farmers’ policy compliance (Ansoms 2009). Logistically, farmer controlling was 
embedded in the ‘decentralized’ district-level governance system of performance 
contracts (locally known as imihigo). Given the designation of food crop agriculture 
as a key development area for almost all of Rwanda’s thirty districts, ambitious 
district-specific objectives were set within this system according to the priorities of 
the country’s agricultural transformation strategy. In particular, annual crop-specific 
targets for the pooling of acreage as well as for yields within these consolidated 
areas were formulated in district performance contracts.3 Additionally, various 
irrigation and mechanization projects were designed and implemented (MINAGRI 
2011), and extensive agricultural research on soil quality and depletion, crop 
diseases, pesticides, breeding of new varieties adapted to local conditions, etc. was 
conducted (RAB 2017).  
Simultaneously, a rigorous commercialization was pursued via the creation and 
continuous upgrading of agricultural value chains. Rural market centres were built, 
farmer membership in cooperatives was encouraged or compelled, these 
cooperatives were trimmed towards for-profit business planning, and the state 
oversaw contracting between them and newly constructed private and parastatal 
agro-processing companies (Harrison 2016). Cooperatives were organised in a four-
level system of grassroots cooperatives, crop- and district-based unions, national 
crop-based federations and one overarching national confederation (MINICOM 
2018). Additionally, sector-based savings and credit cooperatives (Imirenge 
SACCOs) were established nationwide, aiming to financially include rural citizens 
and encouraging them to open a current account for financial transactions, save 
money formally, and take up agricultural loans (MINECOFIN 2009). Furthermore, 
export-oriented cash crops were heavily promoted. These included the 
transformation of the traditional coffee and tea sector from low-value unprocessed to 
high-quality processed exporting as well as experimentation with building up various 
horti-, flori-, and sericulture value chains. In 2019, NAEB launched a highly ambitious 
high-value export crop strategy, intending to almost double export earnings to 1 




3 Many district performance contracts can be found online. For example, almost all district imihigo 




F&cHash=ad46c88d815cc9bd563f53081dafddd4, last accessed on 10 September 2021). Additionally, 
each district has its own website, usually with several performance contracts uploaded. For instance, 
until recently, Nyamagabe District had all but one of its district imihigo since 2008 available on its 
website, which is still accessible via the internet archive The Wayback Machine 
(https://web.archive.org/web/20201027152016/https://nyamagabe.gov.rw/index.php?id=166, last ac-




2.2 Academic Evaluation 
Scholars have heavily criticised the rights-denying nature of agrarian change 
processes in Rwanda and connected it with the ruling elite’s more general 
transformation ideology. And indeed, agricultural policy measures in Rwanda have 
been designed by the ruling party and implemented by the bureaucracy and local 
government entities without properly considering the knowledge and preferences of 
peasants, as confirmed by both farmers (Ansoms 2010; Dawson et al. 2016) and 
policymakers (Ansoms 2009; Behuria 2020). For example, many peasants have 
been compelled to cultivate specific crops, to abandon others, and to cease 
intercropping (Van Damme et al. 2014), to consolidate their land with other farmers 
(Cioffo et al. 2016), and to form cooperatives in order to maintain access to state-
owned wetlands (Bisoka and Ansoms 2020). Some were expropriated without 
compensation and their lands were used for large government cash crop projects 
(Ansoms 2013; Huggins 2014). 
In more general terms, Rwanda’s rural and agrarian strategies fit within the ruling 
elite’s overarching ambition to fundamentally transform the country. The 
government’s approach has been classified as ‘high-modernist social engineering’ 
(Scott 1998), defined as an authoritarian state with enormous coercive power using 
its capable and well-organised bureaucracy to steer a prostrate society into a fully-
fledged social and economic modernisation propelled by the ruling elite’s ideological 
faith in the planability of societal progress (Newbury 2011). In particular, the 
Rwandan government’s actions are understood as aiming to make rural space and 
agriculture ‘legible’ (ibid.), to create the “exemplary citizen on the exemplary hill” 
(Ansoms and Cioffo 2016), to surveil the entire country (Purdeková 2011), to contain 
any form of political dissent (Reyntjens 2004) and to maximise political control in 
general (Reyntjens 2013). In agriculture, the key technocratic instruments were 
simplification (massively reducing complexity by regional crop specialisation) and 
quantification (defining baselines and targets for a large range of indicators). 
Unsurprisingly, these authors conclude that both the ruling elite’s general 
governance approach and its particular agricultural reforms are not sustainable 
(Ansoms et al. 2018). 
Other authors applying different concepts arrive at deviating conclusions. Booth and 
Golooba-Mutebi understand the Rwandan state to be a paragon of ‘developmental 
neopatrimonialism’, where structural conditions and the elite mindset have freed the 
country from the ‘African modal pattern’ of non-developmental clientelism, and which 
succeeds in using state capitalism to bring about the acquisition of technological 
capabilities and high economic growth (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2012). Their 
argument applies selected parts of Khan’s political settlement framework of 
assessing a country’s power configuration and the ruling elite’s ability to centralize 
economic rents (Khan 2000, 2010). They argue that Rwanda’s political economy is 
also conducive to effecting positive agricultural change (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 




Rwandan ruling elite is pursuing agricultural transformation in the form of deepening 
rural capitalist relations and expanding the state’s infrastructural power as a means 
to maximise its political control and remain in power. Therefore, in post-genocide 
Rwanda, the government’s political survival and successful economic development 
go hand in hand (Mann and Berry 2016). Similarly, Harrison considers the negative 
perspective of the academic majority to be based on an incorrect understanding of 
how agricultural transformation is bound to take place following historical precedent. 
He rather describes the dynamic processes as a state-led agrarian capitalist 
transformation that is both risky and promising (Harrison 2017).4 
Peer-reviewed in-depth micro-level research has established that –independent of 
supposed agricultural macro-level output and productivity growth– Rwanda’s 
agricultural reforms have led to severe negative consequences for many smallholder 
farmers and rural communities all over the country. Dawson and co-authors found 
that as a result of agricultural policies “subsistence practices were disrupted, poverty 
exacerbated, local systems of knowledge, trade, and labor were impaired, and land 
tenure security and autonomy were curtailed” (Dawson et al. 2016:204). Pritchard 
concluded that “the rapid and forceful implementation of tenure and agricultural 
policies is unnecessarily undermining the livelihood stability of rural subsistence 
farmers” (Pritchard 2013:186). Nilsson established that a positive association 
between land use consolidation and crop yields did not hold for households with 
landholdings of less than 1 hectare (Nilsson 2019), i.e. 96% of all farms (WFP 2009). 
Clay and King maintain that “deactivation of local risk management institutions has 
diminished climate risk management options for most households” and that those 
without “access to capitals (land, labor, and nonfarm income) […] are pulled deeper 
into poverty with each successive climatic shock” (Clay and King 2019:1).  
2.3 Agricultural Statistics System  
To understand the data analysis (section 3) and its discussion (section 4), it is 
essential to know that two distinct and only loosely connected agricultural data 
collection systems exist in Rwanda: a constantly evolving agricultural survey system 
and a local agronomist production estimation system (existing in most developing 
countries and usually known as ‘routine system’ (Carletto et al. 2015)). The two 
systems are illustrated in turn as follows. 
After the genocide, the comparatively high-quality pre-civil war agricultural data 
collection system had been destroyed (Donovan 2008). In the emergency period 
after 1994, rough harvest estimates were needed to calculate the required food aid 
(FAO and WFP 1997) and to that end, so-called crop forecasting surveys (at that 
time known under the French term enquêtes de prévision des récoltes) were 
conducted from 1997 onwards (Nyabyenda and Niyonsaba 2009). While their 
 
4 The very different conclusions on the success chances and sustainability of Rwanda’s current 
development path originate to a large extent in a fundamentally different basic understanding of the 
nature of economic development, i.e. the premises held and theories applied by various scholars. 





methodology was refined over the years and they were later known as crop 
assessments (CAs), the Rwandan statistics institute highlighted in a 2012 stock-
taking exercise and improvement plan that they never amounted to ex-post output 
estimates but remained “forecasts of potential production produced before the end of 
every season and carried out principally for food security purposes” (NISR 2012:3, 
emphases added). However, up to the fiscal year 2013/14, official agricultural 
statistics were solely based on these biannual CA forecast surveys, even though 
other complementary and partially more professional and reliable agricultural 
surveys were carried out over the years.5 The CAs were eventually discontinued 
after season 2014B. There is no public information available for the methods of pre-
2008 CAs and this missing transparency has been criticised at the time by analysts 
(Donovan 2008). 
The Rwandan government was aware of the poor quality of its statistics at the time 
and worked diligently on its improvement (MINECOFIN 2002). In late 2005, NISR 
was established, and from then on, it was jointly responsible for the production of 
agricultural statistics in collaboration with MINAGRI’s statistics department. 
Authorities realised the need for a large-scale agricultural baseline survey and thus, 
the National Agricultural Survey (NAS) was carried out in 2008. It was in several 
regards an important milestone towards the professionalisation of Rwanda’s 
agricultural statistics system. First, it used a sophisticated and representative 
sampling methodology coming from earlier nationwide general surveys. Second, it 
used rather professional data collection methods (standardized measurement tapes, 
spring balances and buckets) and hence arguably produced more accurate evidence 
than previous surveys. Third, since its results are publicly available, they provide an 
important reference for the simultaneously conducted crop assessments constituting 
official numbers. From then on, all post-2008 CAs surveyed a 25% sub-sample of 
the 10,040 household sample of the NAS (MINAGRI 2009a). However, post-2008 
CAs did not use the improved data collection methods but remained with less 
precise eye estimate approaches (MINAGRI 2009a; NISR 2012). 
In NISR’s first National Strategy for the Development of Statistics (NSDS) 2009-
2014, the need to improve the “forecasting/estimation methodology for crop […] 
production” (NISR 2009:160) was formulated as the top priority goal for agricultural 
statistics. Soon afterwards, it was decided to completely overhaul the agricultural 
data collection system and to set up a modern state-of-the-art statistical framework 
(NISR 2012). External consultants were hired and they set up a seasonal agricultural 
survey (SAS) that was initially conducted in season 2013A, became the sole source 
of official agricultural statistics from the fiscal year 2014/15, and has been carried out 
in each season ever since with further advancements in 2017 and 2020.  
 
5 These included thorough donor-funded biannual household surveys of the Food Security Research 
Project (FSRP) from 1999-2002, the recurring Integrated Household Living Conditions Survey (EICV 
I-IV) in 2000, 2005, 2011 and 2013/14, the Light Rural Sector Survey (LRSS) from 2006-2007, and 
the large 2008 National Agricultural Survey (NAS), intended as a baseline for subsequent crop 
assessments. A visual overview of the different data collection exercises including their current public 




The SAS uses a multiple frame survey design (area and list sampling6), which was 
more professional than in the NAS 2008 (Manzi 2013; NISR 2013). While the survey 
reports and accompanying documents are very transparent on sampling methods 
and content of questionnaires, they hardly mention area and yield measurement 
techniques. It can be deduced that area was measured by using precise satellite 
data. Yield metering was conducted via a mixture of standardised weighing 
procedures and directly asking farmers.7 Thus, the SAS still partially relies on 
farmers’ recall. However, surveying occurred immediately after or even during 
harvesting, thus significantly reducing potential recall biases (Wollburg, Tiberti, and 
Zezza 2021). Most importantly, splitting data collection in two phases and surveying 
production results in the second phase during or after the harvest eliminated the 
likely error in crop assessments resulting from production volume anticipation before 
harvesting began.8 
Largely independent of the survey system’s evolution, the distinct Rwandan routine 
system of agricultural data collection carried out by local government representatives 
and reported to MINAGRI operated in parallel. In Rwanda, where state reach and 
political control is extreme, this administrative system was rebuilt quickly after the 
genocide, and a detailed network of district- and sector-level agronomists 
responsible for both promoting agricultural modernisation and monitoring reform 
results was established throughout the country. This system was streamlined when 
performance contracts were introduced on district level in 2006 entailing annual 
agricultural targets. In 2008, these targets were formulated according to CIP pillars, 
namely priority crop-specific goals for the pooling of acreage as well as for yields 
within these consolidated areas. In 2011, annual performance contracts were 
introduced for ministries and a few years later, joint sector contracts, for example the 
Joint Agriculture Imihigo signed by the Minister of Agriculture as the lead and several 
other ministers and district mayors, were added. Overarching annual objectives are 
taken from national strategy documents and more detailed targets are negotiated 
between everyone involved. While initial baselines came from actual values, those of 
 
6 Area stratification resulted in ten non-overlapping land-use strata, of which three (intensive hillside 
cropland, intensive marshland cropland, and extensive cropland; together accounting for 70.5% of 
total stratified land), were used for sampling. Sample selection was done in two stages, resulting in 
327 selected segments distributed all over the country. The list sampling was complementary to the 
area sampling and enumerated all large-scale farms (LSF). Largeholder farmers were defined as 
cultivating at least 10 ha of cropland or availing of a certain number of livestock (NISR 2013:3). In 
total, there existed 446 of them engaged in crop farming in season 2013A. (The SAS depiction in this 
footnote uses numbers of the 2013 SAS (NISR 2013). In subsequent years, they changed only 
moderately.)  
7 Crop cutting, the gold standard of yield measurement, was tested in 2017, but never introduced on a 
larger scale. 
8 In phase I of both seasons, all small-scale farmers within every selected segment (amounting to 
about 15,000) and all existing crop-cultivating largeholder farmers were identified and interviewed. 
The data collected concerned demographic and social characteristics as well as crop area, planted 
crops and used inputs. In phase II, 25% of largeholder farmers with cropland as well as around 1,800-
1900 small-scale peasants were sampled for questioning. In this phase, data on crop yields and 




subsequent years did not represent past achievements but targets of the previous 
year. Thus, performance contract documents usually do not contain any actual 
values, only past, present and future targets. Actually achieved results of districts 
and ministries are submitted in publicly unavailable imihigo reports to the Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Planning (MINECOFIN). However, realised values of joint 
sector imihigo are publicly available in so-called Backward-looking Joint Sector 
Review Reports (BLJSRRs) compiled by responsible lead ministries. To sum up, in 
parallel to the evolving agricultural survey system that provided data for official 
statistics, a second independent system of decentralized agricultural data collection 
was in place, in which local agronomists reported to what degree annual imihigo 
targets had been achieved. The system’s documented vulnerability to data tweaking 
as well as its interaction with the agricultural survey system is discussed in section 
4.2. 
The switch of the source of official agricultural statistics from crop assessments until 
2013/14 to seasonal agricultural surveys from 2014/15 led to a significant break in 
the Rwandan agricultural data time series. Looking closely at the patterns reveals a 
number of peculiar inconsistencies that raise strong doubts over the prevailing 
narrative of Rwanda’s exponential agricultural production and yield growth during the 
turn of the 2010 decade. The only document (of any kind) that could be found 
studying Rwandan agricultural data in detail was an academic article by Desiere, 
Staelens, and D’Haese. They compared Rwanda’s official crop yield data from the 
FAOSTAT’s database (coming from the country’s crop assessments) with two 
disparate Rwandan sources (the initial SAS from 2013 and the two household 
surveys EICV II and III) between 2006 and 2013 and found remarkable 
discrepancies, letting them conclude that “[official yield] numbers in Rwanda are too 
optimistic and may even be plainly wrong” (Desiere et al. 2016:1384). While their 
study is recapitulated in the synthesis article of Ansoms et al. (2018), in which 
Desiere is a co-author, more recent evidence (i.e. any data from later seasonal 
agricultural surveys) is not included. In fact, not a single academic study, report, or 
other analysis could be identified via in-depth Internet searches that analyses 
Rwandan food crop statistics over the time series break 2013-2015.   
3. Data Analysis 
Examining Rwanda’s agricultural statistics up to 2019, this section offers substantive 
evidence for four claims about the evolution of Rwandan food crop production and 
yields over the last fifteen years. First, according to all available data sources, 
Rwandan food crop production and yields stagnated between 2005 and 2018, a 
finding clearly at odds with the prevailing consensus (3.1). Second, Rwanda 
massively overestimated its agricultural production and yields from 2008-2013, a 
finding not discussed elsewhere. This claim is investigated by firstly scrutinising 
Rwandan data sources and dissecting both the strong rise (2007-2013) and the 
massive drop (2013-2014) of food production levels (3.2), secondly comparing FAO 




the two sources (3.3), and thirdly analysing individual crop data to corroborate the 
findings (3.4). These sub-sections conclude that neither Rwandan nor FAO data is 
reliable. Third, the dismantling of agricultural production data demonstrates that 
Rwanda’s GDP is probably overreported by several percentage points (3.5). Fourth, 
district-level food crop production data as reported in performance contracts was 
similarly overestimated from 2008-2013, and –in contrast to official statistics– output 
volumes in the national performance monitoring system remained on strongly 
inflated levels until at least 2018, which demonstrates the ineffectiveness of imihigo 
contracts in the agricultural domain (3.6). Potential explanations for these findings 
are explored in section 4.  
3.1 Food Crop Production Volume and Yield  
FAO data on Rwandan food production and yields between 2005 and 2018 paints a 
peculiar picture (figure 1a). Production volume increased by 33% from 2007-2013, 
only to reverse back to 2007 levels in subsequent years. For yields, the trend looks 
even worse: food crop productivity jumped by 33% in only three years (2007-2010), 
stayed on this level until 2013, and then slowly deteriorated to values 17% below 
initial levels in 2018. If considering Rwandan data sources9, a similar but significantly 
more extreme trend appears (figure 1b). Production levels (yields) rose by over 70% 
(50%) from 2007 to 2013 and then crashed to a level 20% (33%) below 2007 
 
9 As a result of the rapidly evolving statistics system in Rwanda, there is no single publicly available 
Rwandan data source that covers the entire period 2005-2018. The data analysis at hand mostly uses 
numbers from annual reports of MINAGRI (reproducing official crop assessment data) and seasonal 
agricultural surveys of NISR. For earlier years, data is taken from statistical yearbooks and a report 
from the Rwanda Environment Management Authority (REMA). In general, for most years, statistics 
from more than one Rwandan source exist, and in the course of this analysis, they have been 
thoroughly cross-checked regarding internal consistency. Therefore, the herein used numbers 
robustly represent Rwandan sources. A full list of all studied data sources can be found in appendix 2. 






volumes in 2014. From there, they slowly rose again to almost reach pre-reform 
levels in 2018. The FAO and Rwandan time series for food crop production and 
yields significantly differ, which is uncommon (see section 3.3), but they do converge 
in recent years (figures 1c and 1d). According to both FAO and Rwandan sources, 
Rwandan food crop production and yields did not increase permanently but rather 
exhibited a hump from 2007-2014. Most importantly, in both datasets, production 
and yield levels in 2018 are at or below 2007 levels, constituting stagnation.10 This 
result is clearly at odds with the consensus in the literature as summarised above.11 
3.2 Overestimation 2008-2014 
While Rwandan food crop production data from 2000-2007 is likely of rather poor 
quality (as discussed in section 2.3), it is internally consistent and the FAO has 
adopted all production numbers of these years without changes. Data 
inconsistencies between different publicly available Rwandan sources emerge for 
the first time in 2008 (figure 2), when NISR conducted the NAS. This survey 
estimated production levels for 2008 to have decreased by 22% from 2007. In 
parallel, MINAGRI continued to conduct its CAs in 2008 and reported a 16% 
increase from 2007. As both the sampling and the measurement methods of the 
NAS were much more sophisticated than those of the early CAs (see section 2.3), it 
is highly likely that the low NAS estimate was more accurate than the high CA result. 
The 2008 NAS numbers might therefore be understood as a correction of already 
inflated food crop numbers of 2007 and before. 
From 2009-2014, MINAGRI continued to conduct CAs, which exhibited significant 
annual growth in production levels (henceforth labelled high-growth path). All 
government documents, e.g. all annual reports (AR) from MINAGRI from 2008-
2013/14, the statistical yearbooks from 2008-2013, as well as other strategies and 
reports use these high-growth path numbers.12 The lower production level measured 
by the NAS in 2008 was picked up again by the first seasonal agricultural survey in 
2013, and subsequent SAS from 2014-2019 were in line with it (henceforth labelled 
low-growth path). 
In its AR 2013/14, MINAGRI still reported the high-growth path CA numbers (the last 
two orange data points), while the SAS 2013 and SAS 2014 conducted by NISR 
already reported much lower production levels (the second and third blue data 
 
10 NISR dismissed this conclusion referring to official Rwandan GDP data as evidence for growing 
food crop production (email correspondence with senior NISR employee, 22 May 2021). However, 
strongly growing food crop GDP data rather points to its unreliability than being proper evidence for 
high food crop production growth (see section 3.5).   
11 It might appear hard to believe that this simple insight easily visible from readily available FAO data 
has not been discussed anywhere. The significant gap in academic work might be attributed to a 
comparative scarcity of Rwanda research (even though it is much more studied than many other 
African countries) and/or to a different academic focus. However, the complete lack of mentioning this 
major issue in any report of an international organisation (FAO, World Bank, IMF etc.) is peculiar (see 
section 4.3). 
12 It was already shown above that both academic articles and reports of international organisations 




points). MINAGRI’s AR 2014/15 then started to source its data from the SAS, such 
that numbers for both of its reported years were then much lower. This means that 
for the year 2014, the two corresponding MINAGRI ARs 2013/14 and 2014/15 
document fundamentally different numbers for identical items. Unfortunately, no 
document mentions or explains the change in methodology or the jumps in 
production levels. For the purpose of this paper, high 2013 numbers and low 2014 
numbers have been used, making the sharp drop ‘occur’ from 2013-2014. 
Alternatively, it would appear in the data from 2014-2015, but it is clear that a real 
one-time drop did not happen in this magnitude or at all. Rather, the more 
sophisticated survey methodology showed that real production and yield numbers 
were much lower than reported in the crop assessments. However, Rwanda has not 
adjusted its overestimated 2008-2013 agricultural data so far.13 
The analysis at hand established that even pre-2008 reports might have suffered 
from a fair degree of overestimation, as revealed by the NAS 2008. If taking the still 
shaky14 NAS 2008 production estimates as a base, food crop production actually 
increased by 29% from 2008-2019, constituting an average annual growth rate of 
2.6%. According to this calculation, Rwanda’s agricultural reform would at least have 
produced mediocre output growth. However, a transformational outcome of 
skyrocketing yield growth, which is still considered an established fact by academic 
and international community consensus, can be ruled out. 
 
13 NISR stated that they „advise to use the 2012 onward level of production data for the concerned 
crops [i.e. from the SAS 2013] and adjust the series backward to adjust the overestimation in previous 
years“ (email correspondence with senior NISR employee, 22 May 2021). However, they do not do 
that in any document. 
14 The survey itself states that it did not report yields at all because their measurement turned out to 
be too unreliable (NISR 2008:19). 




3.3 Differences between FAO and Rwandan Data 
Discrepancies between FAO and country data is unusual, as the FAO gets its 
numbers by sending annual questionnaires to country governments asking for 
production and area data of each crop and then calculates the resulting yield. If data 
is missing, the FAO imputes these values using an ensemble approach (FAO 2016). 
However, it does not have a mandate to assess data validity (Desiere et al. 2016). 
Initially, the FAO adopted Rwanda’s high-growth food crop data from 2008-2014. In 
their comparative analysis, Desiere et al. (2016) used this original FAO data (which 
was identical to official Rwandan data). However, as confirmed by the FAO statistics 
department, their interaction with NISR revealed the 2014 break in Rwanda’s 
agricultural time series due to its updated survey methodology (email 
correspondence with FAO employee, 24 June 2020). This is why, at some point in 
time between early 2015 and late 2019, the FAO –based on Rwanda’s advice– 
significantly decreased the country’s production and yield data of three food crops 
from 2008-2013 (table 1), thus leading to significant differences between FAO and 
country data.15 For cassava, the subtracted amounts lay between almost exactly 1 
million (m) metric tonnes (MT) in 2008 and almost exactly 2m MT in 2012 and 2013. 
For Irish potatoes, 1m MT were subtracted in each of the years 2011-2013. Wheat 
production levels were corrected downwards by exactly 90% from 2008-2013.16 
However, none of the other ten crops listed individually each year by Rwandan 
 
15 FAO data is available for download on the FAOSTAT website 
(http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/QC, last accessed on 10 September 2021). The original FAO 
dataset on Rwanda containing old numbers already downloaded in February 2015 was gratefully 
obtained from Sam Desiere, while the updated one was downloaded in December 2019 by the author. 
The old version is not available anymore and no explanation on the changes made could be found on 
the website or in the dataset. The only note that a change has occurred was that the data source for 
some crops and years was ‘FAO estimate’ instead of ‘Official data’. Figure 1 used the updated FAO 
data.   
16 According to correspondence between NISR and FAOSTAT, the wheat production overestimation 
in Rwandan data originated from a digit error (email correspondence with FAO employee, 24 June 
2020). While this is highly doubtful (see section 4.2), it is remarkable that a significant part of 
Rwanda’s reputation of agricultural success is supposedly based on a typographical mistake.   
Table 1: Difference between FAO and Rwandan data in cassava, Irish potato and wheat production 
Cassava Production (MT) 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Rwandan data 779,414 1,681,823 2,019,741 2,377,213 2,579,399 2,716,421 2,948,121 900,227
FAO data (downloaded 10/02/2015) 779,414 1,681,823 2,019,741 2,377,213 2,579,000 2,716,421 2,948,121 ---
FAO data (downloaded 13/12/2019) 779,414 681,800 819,700 977,200 979,000 716,400 948,100 900,227
Difference b/w FAO datasets 0 1,000,023 1,200,041 1,400,013 1,600,000 2,000,021 2,000,021
FAO Source (13/12/2019) Official data
Irish Potato Production (MT) 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Rwandan data 967,283 1,161,943 1,289,623 1,789,404 2,171,517 2,337,706 2,240,715 719,006
FAO data (downloaded 10/02/2015) 967,283 1,161,943 1,289,623 1,789,404 2,171,517 2,337,706 2,240,715 ---
FAO data (downloaded 13/12/2019) 967,283 1,161,943 1,289,623 1,789,404 1,171,500 1,337,700 1,240,700 719,006
Difference b/w FAO datasets 0 0 0 0 1,000,017 1,000,006 1,000,015
FAO Source (13/12/2019) Official data
Wheat Production (MT) 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Rwandan data 24,195 67,869 72,479 77,193 90,684 75,913 70,129 7,886
FAO data (downloaded 10/02/2015) 24,633 67,869 72,479 77,193 90,684 75,913 70,129 ---
FAO data (downloaded 13/12/2019) 24,633 6,700 7,200 7,700 9,000 7,500 7,000 7,886
Difference b/w FAO datasets 0% 90% 90% 90% 90% 90% 90%







sources were changed. According to the FAO, these corrections allowed them to link 
the pre-2014 and post-2014 Rwandan agricultural time series (email correspondence 
with FAO employee, 24 June 2020). Moreover, this significant downwards adaption 
of Rwanda’s agricultural production data confirmed Desiere et al.’s (2016) conclusion 
about pre-correction FAO data being much too high. 
3.4 Development of Individual Crops 
To assess whether FAO data was made sufficiently reliable by manually correcting 
production levels of cassava, Irish potatoes, and wheat downwards, production 
statistics of four other important crops are considered. These are the remaining three 
priority crops rice, beans, and maize, as well as bananas, which are grown in large 
quantities in Rwanda. Together, these seven crops accounted for 96% of the rise 
and 88% of the fall in Rwandan data during the period in question.17 The production 
volume patterns of the four selected crops reveal two distinct patterns (figure 3). For 
rice and beans, annual volumes grew moderately and continuously, and FAO and 
Rwandan data is almost identical. Consequently, there is no evidence of production 
overestimation for these two crops. This looks entirely different for maize and 
banana production. For both crops, there is a massive drop in production levels 
within one or two years in both datasets, exhibiting the same pattern as identified in 
overall food crop production. In Rwandan data, maize production fell by 47% from 
2013-2014, while a two-year drop (2013-2015) of virtually the same size occurred in 
FAO data. Regarding bananas, the production level decreased by 44% from 2013-
2014 in Rwandan data, while an almost identical abrupt decline occurred in FAO 
data from 2016-2017. Interestingly, the massive drop in maize production occurred 
after a fivefold multiplication from 2007-2013, thus ending with a net growth of 314%, 
whereas the large drop in banana production was only preceded by a minor growth 
spurt, thus resulting in a net decline of 29%.18        
These graphs illustrate that Rwandan food crop production overestimation was not 
limited to the three crops manually corrected by the FAO, but also encompassed 
maize and banana production. Since the FAO did not retrospectively correct the 
inflated maize and banana production numbers from 2008-2013 and since taken 
together their rapid decline constitutes 29% of the total fall in food crop production, 
this means that the post-correction FAO dataset is not reliable either. 
Dissecting the production level data patterns for the most important Rwandan food 
crops has shown that it cannot be clarified whether there was any overall food crop 
production growth between 2005 and 2019. Hypothetical real growth was 
overshadowed by massive overestimation and potential real decline was 
overshadowed by the massive one-time correction of this overestimation in 2014. 
 
17 Sweet potatoes are the only ‘large’ crop that is omitted here due to space limitation. However, its 
production output evolution is very similar to the one of beans and does not provide additional 
insights. 
18 This difference suggests that there might have been different mechanisms at work that led to 




3.5 Impact on GDP 
In Rwandan national accounts, food crops are listed as a sub-category of agricultural 
GDP. Depicting food crop GDP development from 2005-2018 against food 
production shows that the two time series are incompatible (figure 4). While the 
strong rise in production levels from 2007-2013 (grey and orange lines) corresponds 
with food crop GDP growth (blue line) during these years, the drop of the former 
must eventually occur in the latter as well, even if crop production quantities used for 
calculating GDP somehow differed from the official ones.19 The conducted analysis 
does not allow any other conclusion than that Rwanda’s food crop GDP (and by 
definition, also its agricultural and total GDP) has been overreported for several 
years.20 Since food crop GDP accounted for 16-19% of overall GDP between 2007 
and 2019 and was responsible for 13% of all GDP growth in this period, its manual 
correction proportionate to food crop production development would have a 
significant negative effect on previous GDP growth, reducing it by 0.7% per year on 
average, as well as on GDP in absolute values, decreasing it by 7.1% in 2017. This 
again would reduce GDP per capita in 2017 from 784 USD to 728 USD. 
 
19 Broadly speaking, food crop GDP (as value-added) for a given year can be calculated by 
multiplying the production volume of each food crop with its price per unit and then subtracting the 
value of inputs and intermediate goods. When using constant prices and the domestic currency 
Rwandan Francs (RWF), neither inflation nor exchange rates can have distorted GDP numbers. The 
value of inputs and intermediate goods rather increased given Rwanda’s rising use of mineral 
fertilisers and other materials. Finally, also relative price changes between crops cannot have 
occurred in such a way that food crop GDP grew continuously. 
20 NISR rejected this finding, arguing that GDP data compilation, additionally to production data, 
requires consumption (household, government), trade (export, import) and inventories data (email 
correspondence with senior NISR employee, 22 May 2021). However, this generic statement about 
the national accounts system does not relate to the argument brought forward here.  




Figure 4: Comparison of Rwandan food crop GDP and total food crop production (2005-2018) 
3.6 Performance Contract Data 
As illustrated in section 2.3, there exists a second independent system of agricultural 
data collection by local agronomists in parallel to the agricultural survey system that 
feeds official statistics. It turns out that during the period of massive overestimation 
from 2008-2013 the outputs of the two data collection systems were roughly 
compatible. Assessing the nine publicly available district performance contracts from 
2012-201421 shows that the annual baselines and targets of consolidated area and 
yields on these aggregated sites for a few priority crops are approximately in line 
with the high-growth path of the crop assessment surveys as reported by 
MINAGRI.22 This means that the districts’ annual performance contracts also 
strongly overestimated food crop numbers.23 Direct evidence for this deduction is 
provided by an RAB evaluation, which found that district agronomists overstated 
consolidated area by 18.3% in season 2013A (Dusengemungu et al. 2013). 
Interestingly, while the reform of the agricultural survey system led to the detection 
and correction of overestimated numbers from 2014 onwards, district-level and 
national agriculture performance contracts continued to report vastly overstated 
numbers. This can be demonstrated by comparing 2018 food crop data from imihigo 
result reports with official numbers from NISR’s seasonal agricultural surveys (table 
2). For all six priority crops, area and yield results are much higher in the former than 
 
21 For the years 2012-2014, performance contracts of nine districts could be retrieved in January 2020 
from their respective websites. The reports are listed along all other studied documents in appendix 2. 
22 Multiplying the consolidated area baselines with the corresponding yield baselines and then 
extrapolating the resulting production volume to the whole country produces numbers which are equal 
to or even higher than the inflated output numbers of the MINAGRI annual report 2012/13. See 
appendix 3 for a more detailed analysis and a table of the actual numbers. 
23 Technically, imihigo contracts contain only baseline and target values, not actually achieved 
numbers. As explained in section 2.3, even baselines need not necessarily represent past actual 
values but might be past targets. However, the existing evidence of target values is sufficient in this 
argument because the Districts Imihigo Evaluation Report 2012-2013 indicates that districts achieved 




in the latter, resulting in massively overreported production levels (ranging from a 
76% excess for rice to a 790% overhang for wheat) in 2018 imihigo data.24 In total, 
food crop production for these six crops within consolidated sites is reported to be 
192% higher than equivalent food harvests as officially indicated. The simultaneous 
existence of the two distinct and diverging food crop data systems is also evident in 
MINAGRI’s AR 2017/18, which reproduces the completely incompatible consolidated 
crop area  from performance contracts (MINAGRI 2018a:1, table 3) and total crop 
area from the SAS (ibid:6-8, table 9). 
This data provides strong evidence for the notion that –at least in the agricultural 
domain– Rwanda’s performance contract system is ineffective in incentivizing or 
compelling government organisations (both districts and the ministry for agriculture) 
to actually achieve transformative development results. To summarize, from 2008-
2014, both the agricultural survey and the administrative data collection system 
produced grossly overestimated food crop estimates. From 2014, the overhaul of the 
agricultural survey system led to a correction of inflated numbers that were adopted 
in official statistics. Simultaneously, the detached administrative data collection 
system propelled by imihigo targets continued to report ever increasing land use 
consolidation and yield growth within these sites without being seriously questioned. 
Even more, the completely incompatible results of joint imihigo reports (BLJSRR) 
and seasonal agricultural surveys were depicted next to each other in official ministry 
reports.  
4. Discussion 
The established findings regarding stagnating and overreported food crop production 
in Rwanda from 2005-2019 raise several questions, of which the following three will 
be discussed in this section: first, why Rwandan food crop production stagnated in 
the examined period in the first place (4.1); second, what led to the proliferation and 
 
24 Annual imihigo targets were set for consolidated area per priority crop and yields on these sites in 
Joint Agriculture Performance Contracts. MINAGRI’s Backward-Looking Joint Sector Review Report 
(BLJSRR) 2017/18 contains actual 2018 yield data for the six priority crops and MINAGRI’s annual 
report 2017/18 depicts realised numbers for consolidated acreage, referring to its imihigo report as 
source. A few earlier BLJSRRs as well as joint agriculture imihigo are publicly available but they all 
contain incomplete data. However, the data points that do exist display an identical degree of 
overestimation. 

























Rice 35,867 5.6 200,852 32,780 3.5 113,880 3,087 2.1 86,972 9% 61% 76%
Wheat 52,155 2.3 119,956 12,225 1.1 13,475 39,930 1.2 106,481 327% 109% 790%
Maize 408,586 3.7 1,511,768 296,330 1.4 424,204 112,256 2.3 1,087,564 38% 158% 256%
I. Potatoes 163,525 22.0 3,597,539 111,480 7.5 835,576 52,045 14.5 2,761,963 47% 194% 331%
Cassava 96,575 20.7 1,999,103 92,113 12.2 1,127,199 4,462 8.5 871,904 5% 69% 77%
Beans 767,410 1.7 1,337,442 556,323 0.9 484,729 211,087 0.9 852,713 38% 100% 176%

















eventual correction of systematic overreporting (4.2); and third, how Rwanda 
acquired and maintained the false reputation of having achieved skyrocketing food 
crop production and yield growth (4.3).  
4.1 Causes of Stagnant Food Crop Production 
Rwanda’s either stagnating (official national and FAO statistics) or mediocrely 
growing (NAS and SAS data) food crop production levels and yields beg the 
question which factors held the country back. It is not attempted here to quantify the 
various causes (and this might not be possible given the availability and quality of 
evidence). Rather, the particular manifestations of prominent technological, 
environmental, human and political economy factors and their likely impact are 
depicted, leading to a hypothesis of their aggregate effect.   
Technological ‘Green Revolution’ Factors 
According to Rwandan government sources, mineral fertiliser application –the most 
effective ingredient to raise yields (McArthur and McCord 2017)– increased from 
0.5kg/ha in 2000 to 43.5 kg/ha in 2019 (MINAGRI 2019). This trend is consistent with 
COMTRADE fertiliser import data.25 Channelling subsidised fertiliser towards four 
priority food crops (maize, rice, wheat, and Irish potatoes) was a central pillar of 
Rwanda’s CIP (Kathiresan 2011). Chemouni (2016) painstakingly describes how the 
country’s fertiliser distribution system was created and managed quite effectively. 
Coincidentally, post-correction FAO yield data of the four subsidized crops highly 
correlates with COMTRADE fertiliser data from 2005-2016 (correlation coefficient of 
0.76), which however –given the demonstrated unreliability of the FAO’s statistics on 
Rwanda’s food crop yields in that period (see section 3.4)– is spurious, and thus 
points towards the peril of shallow impact evaluations using a combination of well-
fitting datasets.26 Given the available data, a more sophisticated regression exercise 
would be futile. In general terms, Rwanda’s strong increase of mineral fertiliser 
import, distribution and application from 2006 would predict high yield growth. 
Considering other technological factors, Rwandan sources indicate high growth of 
plots being subject to irrigation, mechanisation, and the application of improved 
seeds. However, Rwanda’s hilly terrain makes the former two very difficult in large 
parts of the country. As a result, mechanised tillage farming was practised on only 
4.2% of the cultivated area in 2019.27 Similarly, only 3% of agricultural land was 
irrigated and improved seeds were used on merely 8.5% of cultivated land (NISR 
 
25 In the Rwandan case, annual fertiliser imports can be equated with annual fertiliser application, 
since no fertiliser manufacturer existed in Rwanda in the examined period, there were virtually no re-
exports, and just about all imported fertiliser was also applied in the respective year. Three 
independent data sources could be identified (COMTRADE, FAO and IFDC). See appendix 4 for a 
graph depicting their respective developments in relation to food crop yields and showing the volume 
increase from 2006. 
26 And indeed, using a different time series of fertiliser inputs from IFDC results in a negative 
correlation coefficient of -0.7. 
27 Dividing the total mechanised land area of 47,060 ha in 2019 (MINAGRI 2019) by total cultivated 




2019:vii). Good agricultural practices, however, have proliferated widely, exemplified 
by 72% of farm plots being protected against erosion, and almost 50% of plots being 
fertilised with manure (ibid.). In conclusion, all technological variables –most 
importantly mineral fertiliser application– have evolved very favourably over the last 
one and a half decades. Thus, they cannot explain but contradict stagnant food crop 
production and yield numbers.  
Environmental Factors 
Rwanda’s mountainous geography means that it has many micro- and niche 
climates, making technocratic agricultural engineering inherently difficult (Ansoms et 
al. 2018; Clay 2017). Annual rainfall in Rwanda decreased by approximately 16% 
from 2005-201728 and is often quite erratic. While floods, droughts and even 
hailstorms occur regularly, a World Bank risk assessment qualified them as not 
impacting aggregated agricultural production and yields on a national level (Giertz et 
al. 2015). According to the Rwandan government’s disaster reports 2016-2019, 
around 10,000 ha of crop area are on average destroyed each year due to 
rainstorms (50%), floods (24%), hailstorms and landslides (e.g. MINEMA 2019).  
Pests and diseases are having a much larger negative effect on food crop yields. In 
some years and regions, crop-specific illnesses can have significant impacts for food 
security. Moreover, the prevalence of pests and diseases was found to be 
increasing, potentially exacerbated in the future by more drastic climate change 
(Giertz et al. 2015). However, in general, diseases and pests occur locally, and 
therefore, the effects of individual occurrences do not show in national yield data. 
Rather, their constant presence contributes to yields gaps (ibid.). Acidic and depleted 
soil is quite common in many Rwandan agro-ecological zones, which is mainly 
attributed to parent materials and steep slopes (RAB 2021). Soil research, mapping, 
and fertility management, while on the rise, is considered inadequate (Rushemuka, 
Bock, and Mowo 2014).  
Whereas current climate change models are not able to properly simulate the 
particular impact of global warming on Rwanda, it has been observed that the 
country’s rainy seasons have become shorter and more intense, leading to both 
more floods and more droughts and that overall temperature has been increasing 
rather strongly (Giertz et al. 2015). In sum, Rwanda’s environmental situation is 
understood to be gradually worsening due to, among others, advancing climate 
change. However, this evolution occurs incrementally and cannot explain yield 
stagnation in the face of abrupt multiplication of fertiliser application and the 
proliferation of other Green Revolution technologies, some of which are deployed to 




28 Annual rainfall in Rwanda was calculated by using terrestrial precipitation time series of Matsuura 




Human and Political Economy Factors 
For several decades, Rwanda has been facing extreme and increasing land scarcity 
and population density. Some authors have seen this factor as one of several 
causes of the 1994 genocide (André and Platteau 1998; Verpoorten 2012; Verwimp 
2013). The post-genocide Rwandan government stated that the traditional way of 
smallholder subsistence agriculture was a dead end and that a fundamental 
modernisation was required (RoR 2000). Some scholars consider Rwanda’s status 
quo as a neo-Malthusian situation, which justifies the practised vehemence of 
agrarian reform implementation (Harrison 2016; Van Hoyweghen 1999). Others 
explicitly warn of using this narrative and bank on the capability of farmers to 
innovate when induced to do so rather than the government’s approach of imposing 
innovation (Clay 2018; Dawson et al. 2016; Van Damme et al. 2014). 
The detailed micro-level evidence described in section 2.2 found that Rwandan top-
down agricultural policy-making ignored the reality on the ground, including 
agronomic conditions and farmer rationales. Even more, revolutionary, abrupt and 
strict agricultural reform measures created significant upheaval of rural communities 
and farmers’ livelihoods, leading to multidimensional negative effects such as 
decreased food security, increased landlessness and poverty for a large share of the 
population. In a nutshell, the reforms strongly increased inequality by driving a 
wedge in rural communities, enabling a few well-situated farmers to profit from 
modernisation, while the majority lost out. Additionally, the studies argue that 
agricultural policies did not properly account for agro-ecological micro-zones, thus 
exacerbating their other negative effects.  
Aggregated Effect of the Determinants 
Section 3 has elaborated in detail that national food crop production levels and yields 
either stagnated or at most grew very moderately from 2005-2019. Given the almost 
exemplary proliferation of Green Revolution technologies, the aggregate of all 
evidence implies that the turmoil created by the radical reconfiguration of agricultural 
practices from 2008 has been so high that even macro-level performance was 
affected such that the presumably large yield-driving effects of mineral fertilizer 
application and other modernisation techniques were offset by the yield- and 
production-depressing effects of severe systematic disruption of regional 
monocropping and other ad-hoc changes. 
From a purely technocratic view, it would be a mystery why Rwanda’s food 
production levels and yields stagnated (or only grew very moderately) over the last 
fifteen years, despite the country’s ambitious agricultural transformation programme 
and its high technocratic capabilities and state effectiveness. However, with the 
caveat that quantifying any determinant was not possible, taking into account 
abundant and consistent micro-level evidence of disruptive change leads to a 




4.2 Proliferation and Eventual Correction of Systematic Overestimation 
It is well-known that agricultural statistics in developing countries are often of poor 
quality (Jerven 2014). Depending on the employed data collection methodology (and 
after assuming a proper sampling method), several biases might be at work.29 
However, this section does not assess or explain general reporting errors and biases 
in Rwanda’s food crop statistics system that existed already before 2008 and might 
or might not have been eradicated by the introduction of the SAS. Rather, the 
relevant question is why and how the time- and crop-specific massive production and 
yield overestimation from 2008-2014 did occur. In other words, there must have 
been reasons for the strongly rising food crop production numbers in these years 
(irrespective of general biases and errors applying throughout the years), when in 
fact actual production was (almost) stagnating. 
Possible Explanations for Overreporting 
The data patterns presented in section 3 in combination with the information about 
the data collection systems and their methodologies illustrated in section 2.3 
essentially leave two possible explanations for overreporting. Either farmers reported 
ever increasing area, yield and/or production data to crop assessment field 
enumerators while most numbers were in fact stagnating, or crop assessment report 
data did not solely come from crop assessment surveys but was amended upwards 
from MINAGRI’s administrative reporting system of local agronomists, and then, that 
amended data constituted the official statistics. A further theoretical possibility would 
be that the crop assessment report data was deliberately fabricated, i.e. significantly 
pushed upwards. While such bland manipulation is not unheard of in post-genocide 
Rwanda30, there is no evidence for that scenario. Even more, it appears to be quite 
 
29 Often agricultural surveys rely on farmer recall regarding the harvested amount of the last season 
or year. While this approach appears to exhibit no significant bias in either direction (Beegle, Carletto, 
and Himelein 2012), its precision unsurprisingly decreases with time elapsed since harvesting. More 
specifically, peasants systematically underestimate area and overestimate production when surveyed 
several months late (Wollburg, Tiberti, and Zezza 2021). When farmers are asked for their expected 
harvests beforehand (as was done in Rwanda’s CAs), different, country-specific biases might be at 
play. Additionally, there is evidence that farmer overreporting is particularly large, if farms are small 
(Desiere and Jolliffe 2018; Gourlay, Kilic, and Lobell 2019), which is the case for almost all Rwandan 
farms. Furthermore, the production of some crops (e.g. high-value cereals) is much easier to measure 
than that of others such as cassava and bananas (Carletto, Jolliffe, and Banerjee 2015), which are 
the two most popular crops in Rwanda regarding production volume. In particular, when cassava 
ripens, it is often stored in the ground for several months and only harvested immediately before 
consumption or selling. It is only fully harvested in times of need. Banana yields are hard to measure 
because they are a perennial crop. Since 2018, Rwandan SAS have estimated both cultivated and 
harvested area for all crops, which are identical for most crops but differ widely for cassava and 
bananas (NISR 2019). Finally, different incentives might exist for peasants to deliberately over- or 
underreport their land area, production level or yields. Rwanda’s 2012 analysis of its agricultural 
statistics system mentioned underreporting incentives arising from farmers selling their harvest 
informally and overreporting incentives connected to subsidy provision (NISR 2012). 
30 Reyntjens (2013:45, 54) showed how Rwandan 2008 Parliamentary and 2010 Presidential election 




unrealistic, as such a fabrication would require the manual change of thousands of 
individual crop- and district-specific production, yield, and area data points.31 
Examining the likelihood of the two outlined possibilities, there is only scarce written 
evidence regarding the compilation of crop assessment data (i.e. official agricultural 
statistics) from 2008-2014. Of the fourteen undertaken crop assessment surveys 
from season 2008A to season 2014B, only four corresponding reports (season 
2009B, 2010A, 2010B and 2012A) could be found online. According to all of them, 
sampling occurred by making use of the NAS sampling methodology and surveying 
a 25% sub-sample (e.g. MINAGRI 2009a). Moreover, the 2012A crop assessment 
explicitly states that the reported data (which is identical to official statistics) is only 
based on the surveyed sample (MINAGRI 2012). Furthermore, both interviewed 
former MINAGRI employees confirmed this approach. The former intern in the 
MINAGRI statistics department during the 2008-2013 period was responsible for the 
compilation of crop assessment survey data of a few districts into provincial 
aggregates. They confirmed that they received the original data collection sheets 
from field enumerators and transferred and added up the microdata in specific 
spreadsheets. The former MINAGRI senior manager, when asked, explicitly stated 
that local administrative agricultural data and crop assessment survey data (i.e. the 
two distinct data collection systems) were not put together and that official statistics 
were only based on survey results. While acknowledging that experienced Rwanda 
researchers note that the country has “a cultural environment in which concealing or 
distorting the truth are traditionally regarded as both a virtue and an art” 
(Lemarchand 1970 as cited in: Jones 2014:12), it seems unlikely that the evidence 
presented above is entirely distorted to conceal a broadly conceived effort of 
amalgamating crop assessment survey and administrative agronomist data or even 
complete data manipulation. As a result, these scenarios are dismissed as 
explanations for massive overreporting. 
Two Channels of Farmer Overreporting 
This leaves the possibility of the existence of a particular mechanism that led farmers 
to accidentally overestimate or deliberately overreport their seasonal food crop 
production on a massive and annually accumulating scale to field enumerators 
conducting interviews for the biannual crop assessment surveys. There are two 
(potentially synergistic) channels how this could have proliferated. The first comes 
from the general political economy of post-genocide Rwanda. As described above, 
the Rwandan ruling elite has very ambitious plans for the complete reconfiguration of 
 
31 Crop- and district-specific production microdata of the crop assessments 2007-2009 could be 
retrieved by using the internet archive The Wayback Machine 
(https://web.archive.org/web/20120513124226/http://www.countrystat.org/rwa/cont/pxwebquery/ma/1
84spd311/en/vType/quick, last accessed 10 September 2021). This data fit official aggregated crop 
statistics quite well. In particular, while season 2007A data was quite off and rice production data 
deviated for later seasons as well, all other individual crop data added up from all thirty districts fit 
official national statistics almost perfectly. As a consequence, a deliberate manipulation would have 
not just required the adaptation of national level data, but of 390 (30 districts × 13 individual crops) 




rural space and has implemented several far-reaching policies, such as a rural 
resettling programme (villagization or umudugugu) (Newbury 2011) and the 
introduction of performance contracts that in theory even branch out to the level of 
individual households (Huggins 2014). Peasants, who are widely affected by various 
government actions that have increased in number and intensity over the years, 
might attempt to mitigate state interference by complying with policies wherever 
deemed harmless and also by telling officials (including crop assessment field 
enumerators) what they want to hear. As farmers were aware of a strong 
government interest in raising food crop yields and production levels from 2008 
onwards (top-down communication is well organised, occurs regularly and is 
effective in reaching people), they might have ‘played along’ by reporting strong food 
crop growth. As the targeted results were reported to have been achieved each year, 
there was no incentive for responsible bureaucrats to further investigate whether the 
findings were correct.32 
The second channel concerns the distinct agricultural data collection system of local 
government agronomists and the performance contract system which drove their 
actions. It was shown in section 3.6 that imihigo reports strongly overreported 
achieved crop-specific land use consolidation and realised yields within these sites 
and that this continued even after official statistics were adjusted downwards in 
2014. This type of false reporting is known to occur due to “perverse incentives […] 
connecting data to financial incentives without checks and balances” (Sandefur and 
Glassman 2015:129). In particular, from 2008, district governments were given very 
ambitious land use consolidation as well as yield growth targets. In order to keep 
their jobs, local government employees have to perform well (Versailles 2012), which 
is measured solely in imihigo achievement reports. As a result, public officials often 
only care about quantified imihigo targets bar any reasonable deliberations 
(Kathiresan 2012) and are incentivised to tweak the numbers wherever necessary 
and possible. While there is a thorough annual district imihigo auditing process, 
auditors have very limited time to check the veracity of reported accomplishments. 
Both the amount of consolidated land and harvested yields on these sites are hence 
impossible to verify or falsify. Therefore, district governments had a particularly high 
incentive to overreport their achievements in this area (and in particular to report full 
achievement of targets). The Rwandan government was aware of structural 
problems in the performance contract system, namely unrealistically high targets, 
inadequate funding and poorly defined indicators, as early as 2010 (RoR 2010). 
Over the years, evidence of deliberate performance overreporting has been 
uncovered in various sectors (Huggins 2014:375; Linek 2020:30; Williams 2017:555) 
and in 2019, systemic imihigo data fabrication by districts was raised as a critical 
problem by the Rwandan prime minister (Sabiiti 2019).      
 
32 It appears very implausible that farmers themselves believed production and yield levels to 
skyrocket over several years while they were in fact not. Thus, accidental overestimation by peasants 




Now, local government agronomists were aware of biannually conducted crop 
assessment surveys that independently estimated food crop production, area and 
yield, which would allow to compare results of both systems on district level. The 
interviewed former senior manager at MINAGRI remarked that district and sector 
agronomists cannot overreport their achieved results (too strongly), as this would be 
detected when crop assessment surveys found much smaller production in their 
area. While it is not clear whether there was a mechanism to actually cross-check 
results and hold local governments accountable for deviations, the general possibility 
of such an examination provides an incentive for agronomists to influence crop 
assessment surveys in their area. 
Field enumerators of crop assessment surveys relied on rough eye estimates as well 
as farmer recall and forecasting estimates regarding yields and production. Peasants 
were also directly asked for the size of their crop-specific area. Local agronomists 
who visit peasants regularly can easily tell them how large their area of each crop 
(supposedly) is and what yield and production they have reached or are about to 
achieve during each season, relying on their ‘expert’ status.33 Then, both the well-
known tendency in Rwanda to not question authority and farmers’ self-interest in 
telling the government what it wants to hear (and what the local government wants 
them to say) would result in peasants strongly overreporting (consolidated) area, 
yield and production. 
Additionally, it is easy for district and sector agronomists (and some of their 
representatives on lower administrative levels) to be informed in real-time which 
farmers are visited by field enumerators. This is because of the very high population 
density and the particularity of rural political and societal structures in Rwanda, 
described by Prunier as exhibiting an “almost monstrous degree of social control” 
(Prunier 1997:3). In particular, there are informal government representatives on the 
local level that are responsible for the administration of ten households, which 
means that virtually any relevant event occurring in any rural place can always be 
known instantaneously by someone connected to the government. This would allow 
agronomists to remind peasants about their estimates of crop-specific area, yield 
and production before they answer to the questions of field enumerators. 
Potential Driver Exacerbating Overreporting 
It is obvious and hardly accidental that the start of the structural overestimation in 
2008 coincides with the start of the CIP in season 2008A. Furthermore, it is possible 
that parts of the programme were not carefully planned in agricultural strategies 
beforehand (which is usually the case for well-organised Rwanda), but arose rather 
spontaneously from the President himself. A special auditor general report on the 
CIP illustrates that in 2007, Rwanda was suffering from severe food insecurity, and 
that as a result, the President demanded from all ministers involved in rural 
 
33 Their estimation results might have been partially driven by a semi-conscious bias based on the 





development to “launch […] the green revolution in Rwanda” and to “immediately 
end hunger” (Auditor General 2010:8). There appear to exist a few internal 
government documents describing specific agricultural plans but only in 2011, i.e. 
four years after the launch, and only as a result of the auditor general’s lament about 
the lack of any written text, a CIP strategy document was produced by an external 
consultant and published by MINAGRI (Kathiresan 2011). Even more, the second 
Strategic Plan for the Transformation of Agriculture in Rwanda (PSTA II) finalised in 
December 2008 and published in February 2009 hardly mentions the CIP (which 
started in late 2007) and its main rationales of regional crop specialisation and land 
use consolidation but sets different priorities and goals instead (MINAGRI 2009c). 
Therefore, it might well have been the case that the President made an ad-hoc 
decision about extremely ambitious goals and potentially about some measures to 
achieve them, and that the Rwandan governance apparatus rushed to both 
implement the central CIP pillars (land use consolidation and mineral fertiliser 
distribution) as thoroughly as possible (thus causing much disruption and damage as 
captured in micro-level studies cited above) and to tweak the result reports where 
necessary. 
Eventual Detection and Correction 
In an ideal world, agricultural statistics and performance monitoring would have 
immediately detected the ineffectiveness of the disruptive measures described 
above in producing production and yield growth. If it were found that both total and 
priority crop production levels and yields had not (or hardly) increased since the CIP 
start in late 2007, various significant aspects of the agricultural strategy might have 
been adapted and changes would have been implemented. However, as shown 
above, agricultural statistics as produced by MINAGRI’s crop assessments from 
2008-2014 as well as performance monitoring from district imihigo contracts created 
the illusion that priority crop production levels and yields skyrocketed.  
Only the introduction of seasonal agricultural surveys by NISR in 2013 revealed 
massive overestimation. Official statistics were eventually corrected in 2014, 
meaning that grossly false numbers proliferated for ‘only’ six years. This correction 
was a result of the transformation of the agricultural data collection and compilation 
system arguably propelled by continuous improvement efforts based on the 
disinterested pursuit of technocratic excellence. Even more, despite all secretiveness 
and deception deployed in external communication, the inconvenient truth of failing 
to engineer an Asian-style Green Revolution was internally accepted. The 
agricultural statistics system evolved from a standard routine system of 
administrative data collection in combination with a simplistic crop production 
forecasting survey that was highly vulnerable to manipulation towards having 
established and incrementally augmented a state-of-the-art seasonal agricultural 
survey with a sophisticated sampling technique applying a quite reliable estimation 
method of GPS area measurement and a mixture of produce weighing and very 




agricultural statistics can be deemed reliable and sufficiently accurate since 2013.34 
The FAO adopts all Rwandan numbers without changing them manually since 2014, 
and overall production, area and yield data as well as crop-specific numbers have all 
converged and are now identical for most indicators in Rwandan and FAO datasets.  
Without having access to internal communication, the exact process of detection and 
correction cannot be traced. However, a few interesting things can be pointed out. 
First, the results of NISR’s initial SAS 2013 were not included in any other document, 
neither in official MINAGRI numbers (reported to the FAO) nor in the statistical 
yearbook (even though it is published by NISR as well). Even more, the SAS 2013 
report itself tiptoed around the meaning of its results. In its foreword and executive 
summary it omits its most important results (i.e. production levels and yields) and 
concentrates on less relevant summary statistics such as the relative share of 
different crops across seasons. It also never compares its results with the NAS 2008 
or official statistics of 2012. Second, when MINAGRI accepted the SAS 2014 
numbers as official, leading to a major break in the time series, this was mentioned 
nowhere. On the contrary, both MINAGRI annual reports and NISR statistical 
yearbooks, both of which had published easily comparable time series of the 
evolution of food crop production and yields in tables and graphs for years, abruptly 
discontinued them. In its annual report 2014/15, MINAGRI reported low SAS 2015 
numbers and compared them to low SAS 2014 numbers, while the statistical 
yearbooks stopped to contain production numbers at all. Third, Agnes Kalibata, the 
widely celebrated agriculture minister whose tenure as full minister started in July 
2009 after having been state minister since March 2008, was sacked in July 2014 
(around the time the meaning of SAS results would have become clear) and the 
Rwandan government newspaper associated the firing with dismal performance 
(Munyaneza 2014). Kalibata briefly held a post as university administrator that 
represented a strong decline in responsibility before then becoming the managing 
director of the prestigious Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) in 
September 2014 (NAS 2019) and a UN Special Envoy in 2021 (UN 2019). 
4.3 Emergence and Maintenance of False Agricultural Success Reputation 
While the Rwandan government was not able to sustainably raise food crop 
production levels and yields, it proved capable of creating and maintaining a robust 
reputation of having done so. The original emergence of the country’s agricultural 
success story was obviously based on the overreported production and yield growth 
numbers, which were accepted by FAOSTAT, academics and donors. Rwanda’s 
massive increase in mineral fertiliser imports, its well-formulated agricultural 
transformation strategies, its general technocratic capabilities, and the observable 
zeal with which agricultural reforms were implemented made its agricultural growth 
statistics plausible. The real question is how it was possible that the public image of 
 
34 The parallel existence of an imihigo system that still had not adjusted massive overreporting in land 
use consolidation and yields by 2018 as well as continuously rising food crop GDP numbers remain 




Rwanda’s highly successful agricultural transformation was upheld after it adjusted 
its official agricultural statistics strongly downwards in 2014 and officially exhibited 
low production and yield growth from then on.  
The first ingredient was certainly its silence on these developments in any document 
or communication as described above. A second factor that should not be 
underestimated is the willingness of parts of the international community and donors 
to believe in Rwanda’s success, to which they feel to have substantially contributed 
with various development cooperation projects. Closely connected to this is the 
psychological mechanism known in marketing as Halo effect, which describes the 
“tendency for an impression created in one area to influence opinion in another area” 
(Lexico 2021). In particular, someone witnessing many truly remarkable 
developments in post-genocide Rwanda and having seen both physical evidence 
and statistics of rapidly improving agriculture, might (unconsciously) ignore, dismiss 
or explain away new evidence of failing agricultural reform.  
Unfortunately, even the knowing complicity of international organisations cannot be 
ruled out, as exemplified by the allegations of some researchers (Anonymous 2019; 
Desiere 2017) and a Financial Times article (Wilson and Blood 2019) about the 
World Bank deliberately covering for Rwanda’s 2011-2014 poverty number fiddling. 
In the case of agricultural statistics, there are some recent reports that suspiciously 
bypass key performance indicators of yield growth or remain oddly generic in their 
formulations.35 The 2019 flagship report “Future Drivers of Growth in Rwanda” by the 
World Bank and the Government of Rwanda states that “productivity in agriculture 
has increased strongly” (World Bank Group and Government of Rwanda 2019:221). 
A recent FAO report reviewing Rwanda’s food and agriculture policy succeeds in 
largely avoiding any substantial figures on production level and yield growth. One 
graph shows the 2013-14 yield drop in rice without discussing it and the CIP is 
described in a way as if it was just starting and no results were available yet 
(Tuyishime et al. 2020). A comprehensive IMF report states that “interventions [in the 
agricultural sector] have focused on increasing yields […]. Productivity has improved 
through expanded irrigation and fertilizer use, the use of improved seeds, and 
consolidation of land used for larger-scale agriculture” (Redifer et al. 2020). As 
evidence for both food crop stagnation and temporary overreporting is easily 
accessible, it is hard to not conclude that reports of international organisations 
continued to tell the Rwandan agrarian success story against their better knowledge. 
A final and arguably central determinant of Rwanda’s continued agricultural success 
reputation are the brand-building capabilities of its government.36 On the one hand, 
regular contributions on Internet platforms of international organisations (Thomas 
2014 (IMF); UNCTAD 2014; World Bank 2015) as well as occasional articles in 
 
35 This is on top of FAOSTAT not issuing a publicly available note regarding its significant 
retrospective data correction, as discussed in section 3.3. 
36 See Pottier (2002) and Reyntjens (2013, ch.5) for a general illustration of the post-genocide 




widely read international media promote Rwanda’s agricultural success story. Most 
prominently, a 2015 Guardian article co-authored by Agnes Kalibata details how 
Rwanda excelled in eradicating food insecurity and strongly decreased poverty by 
raising agricultural productivity and deploying Green Revolution measures (Kalibata 
and Roy 2015). This article was published at a time when stagnating yields and 
massive overreporting were already well known to the Rwandan government. A 
more recent article written by Kalibata in the Financial Times (Kalibata 2017) and an 
interview with her in Time magazine (Baker 2021) mention Rwanda’s agricultural 
success as a well-established fact in passing.  
On the other hand, Rwanda’s brand-building occurs via the government’s skilful 
navigation of international efforts to raise agricultural productivity on the African 
continent. This can be illustrated by looking at Rwanda’s top performance in the 
Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), a major 
African Union initiative to boost agricultural transformation in its member states. Key 
goals include increased agricultural investment of 10% of governments’ annual 
budgets and 6% of agricultural growth per year. Rwanda was the first country to sign 
the compact in 2007 and designed its agricultural transformation strategy in close 
alignment with CAADP (Golooba-Mutebi 2014). In both the first and second review 
exercise in 2017 and 2019, Rwanda ranked first out of 47 and 49 participating 
African countries, respectively. However, the detailed results for 201737 reveal that 
Rwanda’s remarkable scoring was strongly based on procedural and input indicators 
and sub-indicators, and less so on output or development indicators. For instance, 
Rwanda ranks first and third respectively on the two procedural indicators “Re-
committing to CAADP Process” and “Mutual Accountability for Actions and Results”. 
While these milestones are certainly important and Rwanda did also perform quite 
well in more substantial indicators such as “Enhancing Resilience to Climate 
Variability” (ranked first), in the key outcome “Doubling Agricultural Productivity”, 
which was only a sub-indicator, Rwanda ranked 31st out of 47 (African Union 
2018).38 In sum, Rwanda topped the list because of its ability and willingness to 
satisfy procedural metrics.  
 
37 A comprehensive internet search could not find detailed 2019 results. 
38 The Africa Agricultural Transformation Scorecard used by CAADP uses seven equally weighted 
indicators, which consist each of two to five sub-indicators (21 in total), to come up with a final score. 
For each sub-indicator, there is a benchmark score to be reached until a given year and every country 
is shown to be on track or not for each target. Unfortunately, the performance measurement system 
suffers from a severe arithmetic weakness. For example, indicator 3 “Ending Hunger by 2025” has 
five sub-indicators which go from 0-10 and are all weighted equally. However, the respective 
benchmarks, i.e. expected achievable targets, vary between 1 and 10. Actually, three of the five sub-
indicators have targets of 1.00 (“Doubling agricultural productivity”, “Reduction of post-harvest loss” 
and “Improving food security and nutrition”), while one has 5.53 (“Access to agriculture inputs and 
technologies”) and one has 10.00 (“Strengthening social protection”). This means that a country that 
manages to double its agricultural productivity and reaches 90% of its social protection targets is 
given the same points for these two sub-targets (1+9) as a country that achieves no productivity 
growth and achieves 100% of its social protection target (0+10). As a result, the scorecard contains 
major implicit and highly questionable assumptions about which measures are most important to bring 




In a nutshell, the Rwandan government was able to maintain its image as a 
successful agricultural transformer by banking on the international community’s need 
to believe in major African success stories (or even ‘growth miracles’) and possibly 
even the intentional selectiveness of international development organisations 
regarding evidence consideration, and by communicating effectively and using its 
technocratic capabilities to excel at globally renowned frameworks. This has so far 
sufficed to be universally recognised as a continental Green Revolution paragon with 
skyrocketing yields, while the evidence demonstrating the opposite has been 
mounting since 2013.     
5. Conclusion 
This paper provided new evidence in on-going academic debates on the political 
economy of post-genocide Rwanda. It established that food crop production levels 
and yields (almost) stagnated in the country from 2005-2019 despite the rigorous 
implementation of the government’s ambitious agricultural reform programme that 
included massive land use consolidation, application of huge amounts of mineral 
fertiliser as well as the proliferation of other yield-driving techniques. The most 
plausible explanation for this conundrum was identified as the massive upheaval 
caused by the abrupt disruption of agricultural practices resulting from a forceful 
implementation of over-rigid agrarian reform measures. Additionally, substantive 
evidence for massive overestimation of production volumes and yields of key food 
crops from 2008-2013 by Rwandan authorities was provided. The origin and 
evolution of the overreporting, it was argued, was heavily influenced by the country’s 
performance contract system that compelled local agronomists to report target 
achievement in land use consolidation and yield growth independent of actual 
success. The ruling elite’s unrealistically high expectations coupled with its 
uncompromising enforcement might have encouraged agronomists to command 
peasants to report high yield growth results and led farmers to report the numbers 
that were expected of them on their own account. Finally, it was postulated that 
Rwanda’s reputation as a successful agricultural transformer remained solid due to a 
combination of the country’s excellent brand-building capabilities and a desire of 
international organisations to believe in the success narrative.   
However, it would be incorrect to paint Rwanda’s agricultural reform as a general (or 
total) failure. Based on the low-growth path composed of NAS 2008 and SAS 2013-
2019 numbers, food crop production volumes and yields were increasing moderately 
after all. And even the most scathing critiques agree that –given the country’s 
general situation and demographic trends– profound structural change was (and still 
is) necessary to develop the country in general and its agrarian sector in particular 
(Ansoms 2020). The Rwandan government designed and implemented its 
 
Considering the seven best performing countries concerning yield growth in 2017 (i.e. those that 
reached the particular benchmark target), their overall ranking is quite low (between 9th and 41st 
place). While some of them might have indeed not made good progress in other important areas, their 




agricultural transformation programme based on its modernisation ideology and by 
applying performance contracts as a military-style enforcement instrument that does 
not allow failure or discretion. While this approach was tremendously successful in 
several other domains, most importantly re-asserting political and social control in 
the country and impressive state-building (Jones 2014), it turned out to be 
inappropriate to handle the complex intricacies of transforming traditional intensive 
hill-side subsistence agriculture. Nevertheless, the particular practices of the 
government led to the development of a state-of-the-art agricultural statistics system 
that endogenously discovered massive food crop overreporting (which, however, 
was an endogenous product of the Rwandan governance system itself). The 
authorities built strategic food reserves, heavily invested in and constructed 
infrastructure for post-harvest storage, transport and logistics, built agro-processing 
factories (as a part of Rwanda’s industrial development based on a rare competitive 
advantage), and devised and implemented value-based export strategies regarding 
the traditional cash crops coffee and tea as well as the new agrarian sub-sectors of 
horti-, flori- and sericulture. Not all of these endeavours have (yet) worked out, but it 
would be unjust to deny the genuine and enormous efforts of an institutionalised 
state system to make them work.39 Furthermore, administrative and decentralisation 
reforms, the universal land titling programme and other measures did make the 
Rwandan countryside more ‘legible’, which –despite all justified critique on the 
overzealous high-modernist social engineering of the country’s ruling elite– is a 
necessary ingredient of holistic and fundamental socio-economic development. 
Most importantly, there are some signs that the government has understood and 
internalised that developing the agricultural sector requires more nuance, both in 
allowing local agronomists and farmers more discretion in their production and 
technology decisions, and including their knowledge to build better general strategies 
(Ansoms 2019). This was at least partially driven by increasing resistance and 
complaining of peasants, presumably exacerbated by food shortages coinciding with 
the 2017 Presidential election (Ansoms 2020). Both growing more food security 
crops (sorghum, sweet potatoes) and intercropping practices are allowed again 
under official policies (ibid.). Moreover, in recent years, the Rwandan parliament has 
critically assessed the Ministry for Agriculture, and demanded written or in-person 
answers to its concerns (Kwibuka 2019; Mbonyinshuti 2018). 
This paper did not argue that Rwanda’s government and its governance system 
were ineffective or dysfunctional per se. The relevant benchmark cannot be the most 
successful transforming Asian countries but Rwanda’s own immediate post-genocide 
situation. When comparing its prospects at that point in time with its current status 
 
39 While personal priorities of the President remain the strongest driver for government action in 
Rwanda, even without direct Presidential scrutiny, the institutionalised governance system of annual 
budget planning and supervision, performance contract design, monitoring and evaluation, and a 
culture of hard work in ministries and local governments (Chemouni 2019) ensures that continuous 
work to improve the agricultural sector does take place. This might not be particularly efficient and 





quo, many accomplishments (not its political and human rights situation) do indeed 
come close to a miracle. However, the presented evidence on serious flaws in the 
Rwandan performance contract system regarding agricultural transformation are in 
line with case studies on Rwanda’s industrial development where the government 
did not learn from failure and fell short of adapting its policies accordingly as well 
(Behuria 2015, 2018). Therefore, it appears that regarding the complex processes of 
economic transformation (including agricultural modernisation and industrial 
development), the current imihigo system does not constitute a political economy 
where organisations, companies and individuals are encouraged or compelled to 
learn through failure and adaptation, but rather to pretend to have succeeded. 
Whether the important but so far cautious developments concerning less rigid policy 
implementation will transform into a necessary structural reform of Rwanda’s 
governance and performance contract system that allows more deliberation and 
entails a more effective policy correction mechanism, including the possibility to 
discuss and criticise processes and goals and to allow occasional failure in order to 
learn, is uncertain. However, nothing less might be needed if Rwanda wants to 
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Appendix 1: Overview of Most Post-genocide Surveys Collecting Agricultural Data in Rwanda 




Appendix 2: List of Data Sources 
Bugesera District Imihigo 2011-2012 
Bugesera District Imihigo 2012-2013 
FAOSTAT Dataset Rwandan Agricultural Production, Area & Yield Data 2000-2018 (downloaded 10 
February 2015) 
FAOSTAT Dataset Rwandan Agricultural Production, Area & Yield Data 2000-2018 (downloaded 13 
December 2019) 
FAOSTAT Dataset Rwandan Fertiliser Data 2000-2018 
Gakenke District Imihigo 2011-2012 
Gakenke District Imihigo 2012-2013 
Gakenke District Imihigo 2013-2014 
Huye District Imihigo 2011-2012 
Huye District Imihigo 2012-2013 
Huye District Imihigo 2013-2014 
IFDC Dataset Rwandan Fertiliser Data 2000-2018 
Kicukiro District Imihigo 2011-2012 
Kicukiro District Imihigo 2012-2013 
Kicukiro District Imihigo 2013-2014  
MINAGRI Annual Report 2007 
MINAGRI Annual Report 2008 
MINAGRI Annual Report 2009/10 
MINAGRI Annual Report 2010/11 
MINAGRI Annual Report 2011/12 
MINAGRI Annual Report 2012/13 
MINAGRI Annual Report 2013/14 
MINAGRI Annual Report 2014/15 
MINAGRI Annual Report 2015/16 
MINAGRI Annual Report 2016/17 
MINAGRI Annual Report 2017/18 
MINAGRI Annual Report 2018/19 
MINAGRI Backward Looking Joint Sector Review Report 2008-2009 
MINAGRI Backward Looking Joint Sector Review Report 2014-2015 
MINAGRI Backward Looking Joint Sector Review Report 2015-2016 
MINAGRI Backward Looking Joint Sector Review Report 2017-2018 
MINAGRI Backward Looking Joint Sector Review Report 2018-2019 
MINAGRI Crop Assessment 2009B 
MINAGRI Crop Assessment 2010A 
MINAGRI Crop Assessment 2010B 
MINAGRI Crop Assessment 2012A 
MINAGRI Imihigo 2017-2018 
MINAGRI PSTA I 
MINAGRI PSTA II 
MINAGRI PSTA III 
MINAGRI PSTA IV 




Muhanga District Imihigo 2011-2012 
Muhanga District Imihigo 2013-2014 
NISR Agricultural Household Survey 2017 
NISR EICV II 
NISR EICV III 
NISR EICV IV 
NISR EICV V 
NISR National Agricultural Survey 2008 
NISR Seasonal Agricultural Survey 2013 version 1 
NISR Seasonal Agricultural Survey 2013 version 2 
NISR Seasonal Agricultural Survey 2014 
NISR Seasonal Agricultural Survey 2015 
NISR Seasonal Agricultural Survey 2016 
NISR Seasonal Agricultural Survey 2017 
NISR Seasonal Agricultural Survey 2018 
NISR Seasonal Agricultural Survey 2019 
NISR Statistical Yearbook 2008 
NISR Statistical Yearbook 2009 
NISR Statistical Yearbook 2010 
NISR Statistical Yearbook 2011 
NISR Statistical Yearbook 2012 
NISR Statistical Yearbook 2013 
Nyabihu District Imihigo 2012-2013 
Nyabihu District Imihigo 2013-2014 
Nyamagabe District Imihigo 2011-2012 
Nyamagabe District Imihigo 2013-2014 
REMA Agricultural Report (n.d.) 
Republic of Rwanda Vision 2020 
Republic of Rwanda Agriculture Joint Imihigo 2015-2016 
Republic of Rwanda Agriculture Joint Imihigo 2016-2017 
Republic of Rwanda Agriculture Joint Imihigo 2017-2018 
Republic of Rwanda Agriculture Joint Imihigo 2018-2019 
Republic of Rwanda Districts Imihigo Evaluation Report 2009-2010 
Republic of Rwanda Districts Imihigo Evaluation Report 2010-2011  
Republic of Rwanda Districts Imihigo Evaluation Report 2011-2012  
Republic of Rwanda Districts Imihigo Evaluation Report 2012-2013  
Republic of Rwanda Districts Imihigo Evaluation Report 2014-2015  
Republic of Rwanda Districts Imihigo Evaluation Report 2015-2016  
Republic of Rwanda Districts Imihigo Evaluation Report 2016-2017  
Republic of Rwanda Districts Imihigo Evaluation Report 2017-2018  
Ruhango District Imihigo 2011-2012 
Ruhango District Imihigo 2012-2013 
Ruhango District Imihigo 2013-2014 
Rusizi District Imihigo 2011-2012 




Appendix 3: Overreporting of Consolidated Area and Yield for Individual Crops in 
District Performance Contracts in 2011-2013 
For the fiscal years 2011/12 and 2012/13, nine district performance contracts could 
be found on the respective district government websites. Table A3.a shows the 
reported baselines for the consolidated area (in ha) for the six priority crops. 
Baseline numbers do not necessarily represent the status quo of previous years but 
they do come reasonably close to justify equating them with actual results of the 
previous year in this exercise. Following this logic, it can be seen that all nine 
districts had already achieved some consolidation in maize area, eight had 
accomplished pooling for beans and seven for cassava. Land use consolidation for 
rice, wheat and Irish potatoes were only included in the performance contracts of a 
few of the nine districts. The second last column in table A3.a describes each 
district’s cultivated area as a share of Rwanda’s total cultivated area and shows that 
the nine districts account for 27.3% of the total. These calculations were made based 
on numbers from the Seasonal Agricultural Survey 2017, as earlier numbers do not 
exist. However, it can be reasonably assumed that there was no significant change 
of the share of cultivated land between these nine and the other twenty-one districts.  
Table A3.b depicts the baseline yields (in t/ha) for these nine districts and six crops. 
It can be seen that a yield target was not set for all crops which had an area target. 
However, there are enough entries to calculate a large portion of production volumes 
(in t) in these consolidated areas (see table A3.c). The production volume for each of 
the crops is added up and then extrapolated to the whole country by scaling up the 
27.3% share of cultivated land to 100%. If comparing these numbers to the reported 
total crop production in 2012 in the MINAGRI report 2012/13, coincidentally the 
numbers for wheat and beans match almost exactly. Also cassava numbers are 
close (AR numbers being 7% higher than extrapolated imihigo numbers). However, 
for maize, rice and Irish potatoes, the extrapolated production according to 
performance contracts were significantly higher than the annual report numbers. As 
it was shown that the latter numbers were strongly inflated and since five of six 
imihigo crop numbers are equal or even larger, it can be concluded that the 
performance contract data fits much better with the high-growth path than with the 
low-growth path.  
There are two main factors why these calculated and extrapolated imihigo production 
volumes can be quite off the actually reported numbers by all thirty districts. First, 
districts can differ a lot in their climate, soil and agro-ecological zone, therefore there 
are regional foci, which can mean that the quasi-random sample of the nine districts 
over- or underrepresents some of the crops significantly. Still, the nine districts 
represent all five provinces of Rwanda. This misrepresentation could bias 
extrapolated numbers in both directions. Second, these numbers only account for 
the production in consolidated areas. A large part of total agricultural land is still not 
consolidated and it is not possible to infer the production in these areas from the 
existing numbers, as the yields can be quite different (supposedly significantly lower, 




consolidated areas). However, the total production of all non-consolidated areas for 
the six crops are missing completely. Therefore, the extrapolation is an estimate of 
the lower bound of total production, while it is already 21% larger for the sum of the 
six crops than the annual report numbers. Also, some yield numbers are missing, 
thereby leading to missing entries in the production table. This leads to an 
underrepresentation of crop production as well.  
In conclusion, this analysis shows that reported numbers of consolidated area and 
yield on these sites for 2011/12 and 2012/13 are in line with or even higher than 








Appendix 4: Rwandan Mineral Fertiliser Data 
 Figure A4: Rwandan mineral fertiliser import and food crop yields (2005-2017) 
